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Thefrontpage caption contains the names of all parties involved in this dispute.
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STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

1

vi

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0).
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW & PRESERVATION
Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined repair shop Hanson Equipment
owes a duty of care to tow truck driver Normandeau?
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate
court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is
entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct App.
1997).
Preservation: Hanson Equipment preserved this issue by filing a motion for
summary judgment located in the record at 612-748.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
None.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court erred when it denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary
judgment, incorrectly holding a repair shop owes a duty of care to a tow truck driver.
Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to present their case to the jury, which awarded a
substantial verdict on a case that should have been resolved at summary judgment. One
who improperly repairs a truck does not owe a duty to another who subsequently tows the
truck when it becomes disabled.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This lawsuit arises from the death of tow-truck driver Dennis Normandeau, who
died on November 10, 2001, while preparing to tow a Ryder moving truck that had
broken down at the side of the road. (R. at 619.)
Hanson Equipment, in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, is in the business of servicing
and repairing trucks, including the model involved in this case. (R. at 621.) On
November 8, 2001, Hanson Equipment serviced a hose in this Ryder truck's hydraulic
line for the brakes and power steering. (R. at 621.) The next day, Kristen Marion rented
the truck and planned to drive it to Washington, where she was moving her family. (R. at
622.)
On November 10, 2001, en route to Washington, and while atop Soldier Summit
in Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah, the truck's hydraulic line for the brakes and power
steering failed, and Ms. Marion slowly pulled the truck off to the side of the road. (R. at
622.) Ms. Marion contacted Ryder Roadside Assistance, who initially dispatched tow
truck driver Larry Freeman to the scene. (R. at 622.)
2

When Mr. Freeman arrived, he realized his tow truck was too small to pull the
Ryder truck. (R. at 622.) Nonetheless, Mr. Freeman thought he might be able to fix the
truck, so he removed a hose that appeared to be dripping power steering fluid; he called
various repair shops to find a replacement, but was unable to locate one. (R. at 622.)
Since Mr. Freeman was unable to replace the hose, Kenworth was dispatched to bring a
large diesel wrecker to tow the truck. Kenworth sent Normandeau. (R. at 623.)
Normandeau was Kenworth Sales Company's primary wrecker driver. (R. at
620.) Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth, Kyle Bundy, taught Normandeau how to
test whether or not a vehicle has any torque built up in its drive line. (R. at 620.)

Mr.

Bundy taught Normandeau that if he detected the driveline was not loose, then he needed
to jack a tire up or start the engine and relieve the brake pressure. (R. at 660 at 25:7-23.)
On average, Normandeau towed vehicles with a brake system similar to the Ryder
truck three to five times a month. (R. at 621, 666 at 50:21-51:18.) During his deposition,
Mr. Bundy agreed that it's "Basic Mechanics 101" for wrecker drivers to try to wiggle
the driveline and if it has tension, to put the truck in neutral and raise the rear tires before
disassembling it. (R. at 621, 660 at 26:22-27:24.) Mr. Bundy testified that if a driveline
doesn't wiggle, there is no way to quantify how much tension is built up in it, whether it
be 100 pounds or 10,000 pounds of pressure. (R. at 621.) Normandeau's co-worker
Landon Jacobson testified that before a tow he always checks the driveline to see if there
is any built-up tension in it before he disassembles it. (R. at 624.)
In order to tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline so as not to
damage the truck's transmission. (R. at 846.) Unfortunately, torque had built up in the
3

driveline, and when Normandeau started to remove the third of four bolts connecting the
driveline, it broke free, suddenly striking him in the head and killing him. (R. at 623.)
Claim
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege only one theory of liability against
defendant Hanson Equipment: the repair shop negligently repaired the truck, which
caused it "to break down under circumstances that required it to be towed." (R. at 181194.)
Procedural History
Hanson Equipment filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing plaintiffs could
not establish a duty of care was owed to Normandeau. (R. at 626-634.) (Hanson
Equipment made other arguments regarding lack of proximate cause and contributory
negligence; however, these arguments are now irrelevant to this appeal.) The trial court
denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary judgment without providing any basis
for its denial. (R. at 1182-84.) This case was subsequently tried to a jury, which returned
a verdict for the Normandeaus.
Hanson Equipment appealed the trial court's denial of its pretrial motion for
summary judgment on the duty issue. This Court held it could not review the ruling since
Hanson Equipment did not reraise the issue at trial nor move for a directed verdict on it.
See Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2007 UT App 382, ffll3-14, 174 P.3d 1.
However, since "our case law has been less than clear in defining when appellate review
of denials for summary judgment motions is precluded," the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. See Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2009 UT 44 at f 7. The Supreme
4

Court ivwrsnl tin/ d'vision ol (In ; < onrl ,iit<i held ;i denial of a pretrial summary
judgment motion is reviewable where, like here; the basis for (lie motion IN purely legal.
See id, at ^16-17.
i his < Mill iir1 ilvd (he parties to provide self-contained briefs to supercede or •
replace the briefs already of record,, rather than provide si lpplei nei ital briefs, to a;v oid
dealing with two layers of briefing. (See Order of Judge Gregory K. Orme, dated
Sepfenibei 1 I, Mil

• ..

•- .

'•.-• •

. . . '

••

• -. .

SUMMARY OK ARGUMENT
Repair shop Hanson Equipment does not owe a duty of care to tow truck driver
Normiindeau. «uid (he trial court erred when it denied Hanson Equipment's motion for
summary judgment on this issue.
ARGUMENT
I.

Under Traditional Negligence Analysis, A Vehicle Repair Shop
Owes No Doty of Care to a Tow Truck Driver.
A. Where no disputed issues of fact exist, the trial court erred in imposing a duty
where the parties5 relationship is highly attenuated and no other
circumstances exist to find a duty of care.
Based on (In: parties' attenuated relationship and the Utah Supreme Court's

guidance, the trial court erred when it concluded a repaii • li. »p * n\ al ;i low \v\wk driver a
duty of care when its repair rendered a vehicle inoperable. '"One essential element of a
negligence action is a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by [the] defendant.
Absent a showing of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover.'" Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch,
1999 UT 20,1[9, 979 P.2d 317. A duty has been described as "a question of whether the
5

defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff." Ferree v. State
of Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (quotation omitted). "A court determines
whether a duty exists by analyzing the legal relationship between the parties, the
foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which party can best
bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other general policy considerations." See
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2009 UT 44 at f 19 (citations omitted).
In wrestling with whether a duty was owed in this case, the Utah Supreme Court
provided some guidance to the analysis of when a duty is created. Importantly, the
Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that duty was fact intensive, intertwined with
foreseeability, and related to factual issues presented at trial. Instead, the Supreme Court
stated: "Foreseeability as a factor in determining duty does not relate to the specifics of
the alleged tortious conduct but rather to the general relationship between the alleged
tortfeasor and the victim." Normandeau IL at ^f 20. "At times, factual issues may bear on
the issue of foreseeability as it relates to duty, but [Normandeau] is not such a case....in
this case, there is no specific relationship test to be applied to determine whether Hanson
owed Mr. Normandeau a duty. Rather, the court had the undisputed facts necessary to
examine the legal relationships between the parties and analyze the duties created by
these relationships." Id, at ^f 21 (quotations and citations omitted).
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs generally allege a theory of negligence
against defendant Hanson Equipment, but do not state what legal duty was owed to tow
truck driver Normandeau, because no such duty exists. The only act which could form
the basis of a duty was the repair of the truck's hydraulic hose. Thus, plaintiffs needed to
6

articulate a dul\ ul uiiv llml cvislni behuvti Hanson Equipment and Normandeau based
on the parties' relationship. However, the parties' relationship is ten i .ittrniutal lor the
repair shop to owe a duty of care to a tow truck driver.
Given Hit plaintiffs' vague statement about the duty owed, the trial court was left
with little .guidance as to what gave rise to the dui) -. -^is case, I Itah law „ how ever,
provides the necessary guidance: "resolution of this [duty] issue begins with an
examination m liu; fq»al relationships between, the parties, followed by an analysis of the
duties created by these relationships.' Loveland v. Grem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766
(Utah 1987). A legal duty "is the product of policy judgments applied to relationships."
DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co,, 835 P.2d 1000, 1003-4 (Utah Ct App. 1992). To
properly answer whether or not a duty is owed, "a t

k i . i:*,• ih;i: uu-

structure and dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to the duty.... A
relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be accompanied by a duty than one,
for example, in which parties are in privity of contract." Yazd v. Woodside Hopes Corp.,
2006 UT 47, ^15-16 (emphasis added).
In addition to evaluating the parties' relationship, courts weigh other factors to
determine if a duty of care is owed

*

! !hcr or not the plaintiff was reasonably

foreseeable. In Utah, although foreseeability is not determinative, it is one of the factors
used (V determine the existence of a duty of care: "[WJhether the law imposes a duty
does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the
burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that bin den upon

7

defendant, must also be taken into account." AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp.
ofAmerica, 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted).
At summary judgment, the important undisputed facts were: tow truck drivers
know a truck's driveline has to be disconnected to avoid damaging the transmission;
Normandeau was employed as his company's primary wrecker driver; as part of his job,
Normandeau was taught to check for and relieve torque that naturally occurs in a
driveline; Hanson Equipment repaired the hydraulic line in the subject truck; two days
later while the truck was being driven, the hydraulic line failed, causing the truck to
become disabled and require a tow to a mechanic's shop. Without providing a basis for
its denial, the district court incorrectly denied Hanson Equipment's motion, effectively
holding a repair shop has a sufficiently close relationship to owe a duty of care to a tow
truck driver injured during the course of his job.
In this case, however, there is no legal support to assign a duty of care to Hanson
Equipment. No duty of care should be owed by a repair shop to a tow truck driver who is
summoned to tow a vehicle disabled by its incorrect repair. To impose a duty here would
be akin to holding a gas station liable when its attendant insufficiently fuels a vehicle,
causing it to run out of gas and need a tow. The mere furnishing of the necessity of
needing a repair person is not sufficient to impose a duty. See, e.g., Carol Lorane Bryant
v. Glastetter, 32 Cal.App.4th 770, 782 (1995) (drunk driver owed no duty to tow truck
driver who was called to tow car after driver was arrested); Sanders v. Posi-Seal Int'l 668
So. 2d 742, (La, Ct. App. 1996) (despite company's repairs to valve, company did not
owe duty to subsequent repairman who was injured while repairing valve).
8

Should Hanson )'<|iii|ini<'Mi have foreseen that a negligent repair of a hydraulic •
hose would lead to the injury of a tow truck driver who did not lice*! (tic danucrs inherent
in a truck's braking system? Furthermore, should Hanson Equipment have foreseen that
it inn (i in lx di liver would fail to take a known precaution to check for and relieve torque
in the truck's driveline? The answer to both question1, is m» As such, I ianson Equ.ipiTi.ent
owed no duty of care to the tow truck driver called to tow the Ryder truck when one of its
hydraulic 1 loses failed.
Whether a duty is owed "requires a careful consideration of the consequences for.
the parties and society at large." Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah
1986), To extend a duty of care to a tow truck driver due to negligent repairs made by a
mechanic would essentially burden mechanics shop with na- ^ligation to compensate
tow truck drivers for injuries suffered while doing their job. Repair shops are not insurers
of tow truck drivers—to operate, towers are required to purchase hefty insurance policies
for their hazardous jobs, and the oitiis of responsibility for following proper procedure is
best placed on them. They are trained how to safely tow trucks in variety ol
circumstances, and no tow is like any other—the vehicles, weather conditions, time of
day, and locations are always differed

ow truck operator like Normandeau is

engaged in an occupation where he knows or should know how to tow a disabled vd ride.
Why a vehicle breaks down is not of much concern to a tow truck operator-his only task
is to toM if To (IIIKI ;i duly here would lay responsibility for the safety of tow truck
drivers at the feet of all those who wreck, improperly minnhiiii. oi abandon Ihni \ dudes,
and not necessarily through any fault of their own.
9

B. Case on Point Holding No Duty of Care Owed by Prior Repair Shops to
Subsequent Mechanics
In Reimer v. City of Crookston, 326 R3d 957 (8th Cir. 2003), plaintiff was a
repairman who was injured while repairing a broken down boiler. Among others, he sued
Johnson Controls, the company that had performed previous maintenance services to the
boiler. The court dismissed Johnson Controls because it found no duty of care was owed
to the subsequent repairman. Id, at 959. After explaining that the existence of a duty
depended upon "(1) the relationship of the parties, and (2) the foreseeability of the risk
involved," id at 965, the court stated, "The mere fact that on occasion Johnson Controls
would do...work does not...create a duty on its part to anyone down the line who may be
harmed by the boiler." Id. In other words, just because an initial repairperson performs
maintenance or repairs on an item, he or she does not owe a duty of care to a subsequent
repairperson who might be injured while repairing or servicing the item. See idJohnson Controls' repairman never worked on the part that broke and caused
injury, but this is of no consequence. The Reimer court further explained that one repair
shop does not automatically owe a duty to a subsequent repair person by virtue of
providing prior repairs. Here, Hanson Equipment did not work on the driveline that
caused the injury, it worked on a hose in the hydraulic line that apparently broke.
Plaintiffs' only claim against Hanson Equipment should have been dismissed for
the same reason. The mere fact that Hanson Equipment performed maintenance work on
the truck does not create a duty on its part to Normandeau, a tow truck driver "down the
line" who was harmed while doing his job. It was unforseeable to Hanson Equipment, a
10

repair shop, tluf a low toul dnver would In: injured while preparing to tow a vehicle that
had pulled over due to its allegedly negligent repair. The injun to plaintiff here is n n i
remote and unrelated to the repair.
I, ', S ( H i \ i i i l I t i ' l i i l i n h i i N l i i i d i

• ••

Finally, plaintiffs have alleged no facts to create a spei iai relit I inn ship \\ Inch
would warrant the imposition of a non-traditional duty of control or protection. In
Drysdaie v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah App.1994) (court held parents of intoxicated adult
driver owed no duty to mother of child injured in ;m .nitnmnhlc accident! thr

I

noted that Utah has generally applied the "special relation" analysis in Sections 314
111 iioiiiiji V/!0 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 2-3. Section 315 sets out the
tort principle that one generally does not owe ;i duiv lo control the conduct of third
persons unless a special relation exists, either between the actor and the third person or
between the actor and the plaintiff. 1 Id. at 3 (quotation and citations omitted.)
"The essence of u spei i,11 lelalionship is dependence by one party upon the other
or mutual dependence between the parties." Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413,
415 (I Jtah 1986). "These relationships generally arise when one assumes responsibility
for another's safety or deprives another of his or her in H iii.il opportunities for selfprotection." Id "Legal duties are often found to exist in the context of contractual,
fiduciary, and filial relationships.55 Id.
l The "special relations55 that give rise to a duty to aid or protect another are: a common
carrier to its passengers (see Restatement (Second) of Torts §314A(1) (1965)); an
innkeeper to its guests (see id. at §314A(2)); a possessor of land to the public in response
to an invitation (see id. at §314A(3)); and, one who takes custody of another so as to
deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection (see id. at §314A(4)).

In the instant case, no relationship exists—much less a special relationship—
between repair shop Hanson Equipment and wrecker driver Normandeau, nor is one
alleged. No contractual, fiduciary, or filial relationship exists between a tow truck driver
and a repair shop which does an improper repair. The tow truck driver is not dependent
in any way upon the repair shop. Hanson Equipment did not assume responsibility for
Normandeau nor did it deprive him of his normal opportunities for self-protection. This
tow truck driver was unknown to this repair shop. Because no special relationship exists
between Hanson Equipment and Normandeau, the company owes him no duty of care.
II.

The Professional-Rescuer Doctrine is Analagous
Although Normandeau was not a public safety employee paid by taxpayers, his

profession is analogous to that of a firefighter or police officer. Normandeau was a
professional whose job it was to go to the scene of disabled or wrecked vehicles, hook
them up for towing, and tow them off roadways for safety and for repair. Put generally,
the professional rescuer rule "bars those engaged in rescue work as part of their
employment from recovering damages for injuries sustained on the job as a result of the
negligence of the person rescued.5' 57 A Am.Jur.2d Negligence, §782 (2004).
In Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's
adoption of the "professional-rescuer doctrine." Fordham, a highway patrolman, was
called to the scene of a traffic accident negligently caused by Oldroyd; while Fordham
was in the process of retrieving flares from the trunk of his vehicle, an oncoming driver
lost control of her vehicle and struck him. Fordham sued Oldroyd, the earlier driver to
whose accident Fordham had been summoned. Determining that Fordham's claims
12

against ()Mrn\d are haired, (lie Court adopted the professional-rescuer doctrine on the
grounds of sound public policy. The Supreme (\n\v\ s toitimlalioii ol tin, rule IN based on
sound public policy judgment: "a person does not owe a duty of care to a professional
rescuer for injurx that was sustained by the very negligence that occasioned the rescuer's
presence and that was within the scoj

TI- !p-

?

,

« i escuer's diities..."

Fordham and many cases that address the professional-rescuer rule involve a
ic safety officer like a firefighter or police officer; however, its rationale is not
limited to public employees, alilioiii'ti ii.s, holding t\ ' In adopting the professional rescuer
nomenclature, the Supreme Court notes the rule "has a broader reach to bar negligence
claims by those who take on a professional duty to recue others irrespective of whether
they do so in a public «»" private capacity." 2f

4, %l, in

The Fordham rationale

serves us well in this case, which involves a private professional rescuer—a tow Inick
operator.
For ils appeal, Hanson Equipment assumes its mechanic's negligent repair caused
the rental truck to break down. Because of this negligent repaii, Nontuiideaii was
summoned to the scene to tow the truck to where it could be fixed. Normandeau's injury
arose 01

^he negligence that occasioned his presence. However, his injury was within

the scope of those risks inherent in his job as a professional resetlei
Normandeau's chosen profession is inherently dangerous. As his company's
primary wrecker drivei, he was hired, trained, and compensated to handle hazardous
2 "Because it is not necessary to do more to reach the result in this case, we limit
application of the rule to professional rescuers who, like firefighters and police officers,
are public employees." 2007 UT 74, f 14.
13

situations. Tow truck drivers encounter a different situation every time they tow a
vehicle; they are summoned to the scenes of accidents to tow disabled or wrecked
vehicles, to impound vehicles from streets and highways, to precarious places with
stranded or distressed motorists. Other inherently dangerous professions include roofers,
electricians, pilots, farmers, and construction workers, to name a few.
In the case before this Court, it would offend public policy considerations to
permit an act of negligence to expose the tortfeasor to liability for injuries sustained in
the course of one's performance of necessary, inherently dangerous, duties. Tow truck
operators are surrounded, just like highway patrolmen are, by hazardous working
conditions—vehicles moving at high speed, inclement weather, poor road conditions, and
working in the dark at nighttime. These are hazardous jobs wherein the pay reflects the
hazards undertaken and expensive workers compensation benefits are provided.
This Court agreed with this application of the rule and barred Fordham's claims
since all Oldroyd did is cause the need for the services of a rescuer, whose job it is to
provide assistance for disabled vehicles. In our case, all that can be said is that the bad
repair by Hanson Equipment caused the need for a tow truck operator to tow it where it
could be repaired. Hanson Equipment owed no duty to any tow truck driver.
A. California has applied the Professional Rescuer Doctrine to Tow Truck
Drivers,
In Holland v. Crumb, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994),3 the Court of
Appeals for the Second District of California applied the professional rescuer doctrine to

3

In Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 34 C a l Rptr. 2d 360, (1994) the
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tow truck driver brought a personal injury action against several
defendants who were involved in a chain of automobile accidents, claiming llial the
defendants were liable for the injuries he received when he was struck by a third-party
vehicle v\ liiic performing his towing services/ The court first defined the doctrine as a
rule that:
addresses those instances where a plaintiffs occupation positions him in a
situation which was brought about by the negligent acts of another and in
which the plaintiff becomes injured. The rule prevents the injured plaintiff
from recovering against the other party if the injury resulted from a risk of
harm which is natural to the plaintiffs occupation.
Id. at 368. Like plaintiffs in the present action, the plaintiffs in Crumb argued that the
fireman's rule could not be applied to tow truck drivers because they were not peace
officers or firefighters. Id. at 36y. 1 fowever, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs
contention and dismissed it as meritless. Id. In response, the court stated that "[t]he
application of the firefighter's rule depends on the inherent dangers associated with one's
employment, not with , . extraneous matters," Id. at 369-70.

Supreme Court of California, in a footnote, "rejected] the reasoning of the court in
Holland v. Crumb" regarding application of the firefighter's rule to the claim of a
privately employed tow truck driver. Although this decision seemed to have cast
doubt as to Holland's validity, the court in Dyer v. Superior Court clarified the
Neighbarger holding with regard to the Holland case and stated that the footnote
"viewed in context, does not overrule the holding in Holland" and that "the
Neighbarger footnote leaves the holding in Holland intact." 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 85,
67-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erroneously denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary
judgment, effectively holding that a repair shop owes a duty of care to a truck driver.
Repair shops and tow truck drivers have no special relationship which would impose a
duty of care on the former. Repair shops have no contractual, fiduciary, or filial
relationships with a tow truck drivers called to tow a vehicle disabled due to their
improper repair. The relationship between repair shops and the wrecker drivers is too
attenuated to impose a duty. Tow truck drivers are like professional rescuers who have
chosen a dangerous profession. They are often summoned to unsafe places and face
hazardous conditions due to the negligence of another. One does not owe a duty of care
to a professional rescuer who is injured conducting the duties inherent in his job. Hanson
Equipment requests this Court reverse the trial court's decision and hold repair shops owe
no duty of care to tow truck drivers.
DATED this 26th day of October, 2009.
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NO ADDENDUM IS REQUIRED.
This appeal does not turn on the interpretation of any constitutional provisions,
rules or statutes. None of the cited rules are of "central importance" to the appeal. To the
extent a rule of civil procedure is cited, the relevant portion of the rule is set forth in the
argument section of the brief. Although this is an appeal from an interim order from the
trial court, that order does not provide any basis, details or analysis of the trial court's
decision that would aid this Court in its review of it.
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